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Abstract 
This paper investigates the key drivers and key inhibitors from an Information System (IS) 
Security and Business Continuity Management (BCM) perspective. The research was 
conducted using a forum with personnel from nine government agencies with follow-up 
interviews with personnel from a further sixteen agencies. The study identifies key issues 
across a broad cross-section of government organisations.  These key issues include 
awareness and active management support, training and appropriate funding.  The issues 
identified are useful to management when implementing IS Security and undertaking 
Business Continuity Planning over e-government within agencies. 
1. Introduction 
Prior to e-Government, records and information were mainly stored on paper in files, 
filing cabinets, and vaults. Paper documents have a degree of separation between the 
client and the flow, storage and retrieval of documents. Manual records management 
systems and processes, established procedures to process and transfer documents through 
the system.  These documents could be tracked transparently through the organisation. 
Hence, if tampered with, the changes would be clearly evident. These paper documents 
were subject to a level of security considered to be acceptable at that time. The security 
measures required to protect them focused mainly on the physical protection of the 
document and restricting permissions for people to access the records. While these 
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documents could be copied, the paper type, the colour and the size would be difficult to 
match with or replace the original. Also, copying documents is traditionally a relatively 
slow process.  
Security threats and protective measures for these paper based systems were identified 
and resolved. They were written into polices and procedures, and updated over many 
years. This provided a degree of security for documents completely different to that of 
Intranet or Internet based systems which have the capability to immediately download 
information, giving the client (end user) the ability to copy and re-transmit this 
information in nanoseconds. This vulnerability exists for any organisation, whether 
private or public, that has a web presence (Straub et al., 1998: Backhouse et al., 2001). 
Information system security has previously concentrated on confidentiality of documents 
stored electronically (Spinellis et al., 1999).  In terms of the public perception of 
government organisations, security means the protection of records and data that are held 
for the purpose of recording, administering and monitoring the actions and policies of 
government agencies.  This applies equally to paper documents and the data held on 
computer databases (Kiel, 2003).  The rapid growth in the volume of information stored 
electronically and the uptake of e-commerce within government has heightened the need 
for increased security to protect the privacy of this information and prevent fraudulent 
activities (Bradford, 1999). 
Electronic information is extremely portable and also very easy to modify.  The 
administration, business and legal processes associated with security and protection of 
electronic government information have not been fully developed (Scott, 2003; Kraemer 
et al., 2000; Teo et al., 2003).  Consequently government projects are endeavouring to 
develop policies and procedures to improve security (Frank, 2003).  From the public’s 
perspective, government is seen as one entity; hence a security problem within one 
agency may be viewed as a failure of the whole of government process.  Therefore the 
process of maintaining and improving information security across all government 
agencies is viewed as an essential project.  The research discussed in this paper forms part 
of a longitudinal action research study to help inform and improve information security 
across government.  This paper reports on an initial research study, which involved a 
forum for and follow-up interviews of key agencies to determine the key drivers and 
inhibitors for information system security and business continuity planning (BCP) within 
and across government. 
The ISO Standard AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2001 Information technology — Code of 
practice for information security management contains twelve major sections which deal 
with information security issues. One section, Section 11, deals with Business Continuity 
Management (as a component of the information security issue ‘availability’ of 
information).  As the agencies are required to achieve compliance with this standard, the 
forum questions were grouped around the eleven Information Security and one Business 
Continuity Management which incorporates Business Continuity Planning (BCP) sections 
of the standard.  [It should be noted that Business Continuity Management (BCM) 
incorporates Business Continuity Planning, and BCP in an information technology 
environment is also often referred to as Disaster Recovery Planning (DRP)]. 
The focus of AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2001 is to protect security of information by 
providing a set of recommendations (in effect controls and best practices) for situations 
that are applicable for E-commerce and also E-government. With the increasing volume 
of business being conducted between organisations over electronic networks it is essential 
that a trusted relationship be established between the stakeholders trading together. One 
such scheme is for all parties to agree on an appropriate standard and adopt it, adhere to 
its principles and move to accreditation [The standard in this case is 
AS/NZS7799.2.2003]. 
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A number of frameworks have been developed and tested since the 1970s to quantify and 
manage the issue of information system security. Australia’s standard for Information 
Security Management (AS/NZS7799: 2000) and the second part Information security 
management Part 2: Specification for information security management systems 
(AS/NZS7799.2.2003), provide a framework and set of recommendations in a risk 
management context. 
The second part of the Australian Standard, AS/NZS7799.2.2003, is an adoption of the 
British standard BS 7799.2:2002 Information security management systems, Part 2: 
Specification with guidance for use. 
The first part, AS/NZS7799: 2000, has been revised for application to e-Commerce, and 
was re-branded from its original publication  as AS/NZS 4444: 1996. The current 
standard (first part) for Information System Management is Information technology—
Code of practice for information security management - AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2001 
with an amendment in 2004, redesignated from AS/NZS7799: 2000 The latest version is 
acknowledged as a generic guide for the establishment and implementation of a process 
such as information system security management and information system risk 
management. 
Certification is possible for ‘7799’ and is recognised internationally (under ISO 17799). 
There are, however, very few organisations that can offer this service, currently only two 
within Australia. The adoption of standards is becoming increasingly important to 
establish benchmarks and assurance for organisations and clients that conduct business 
on-line. An additional benefit of certification to this standard is its regular (6 monthly) 
audit reviews which ensure certification to the standard is maintained, thus providing 
extra rigor and assurance regarding security compliance. 
From a global perspective, all Government priorities are generally to fulfil the following 
objectives: 
•  Improving service delivery - to tangibly improve service delivery and satisfy the 
highest service priorities of people, businesses, communities and employees by 
redirecting resources to priority services. 
•  Getting value for money from the public purse - Government expects agencies to 
operate within their budgets, rigorously pursue efficiencies, streamline regulatory 
systems and cut “red tape”. 
•  Aligning supporting government agendas - Government wants to ensure that public 
sector planning, investment and management strategies align with its goals and that 
agencies work together to achieve the Government’s priorities (OICT, 2004). 
 
These objectives are used to drive the delivery of several services through different 
delivery channels and are made available to ensure that they function for people, 
businesses, communities and employees.  Agencies and clusters take a systematic 
approach to obtaining regular feedback from users to be better informed about people’s 
needs and expectations.  Regularly refreshing this knowledge and using it in tandem with 
other research is a prerequisite for identifying Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) based service delivery solutions. 
1.1 Definitions of IS Security and BCP 
IS Security (ISS) is effective implementation of policies to ensure the confidentiality, 
availability and integrity of information and assets is protected from theft, tampering, 
manipulation or corruption.  BCP (which is incorporated in BCM) is planning to mitigate 
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the adverse effects of an unexpected catastrophe, which may result in the loss of services, 
operations or information for a period of time.  Some explanation of these terms is 
provided below. 
“Information systems security is the protection of information systems against 
unauthorized access to or modification of information whether in storage, processing, or 
transit, and against denial of service to authorized users, including those measures 
necessary to detect, document, and counter such threats” (NSTISSC, 1999, p4). 
Business Continuity Management (BCM) is defined as a “holistic management process 
that identifies potential impacts that threaten an organisation and provides a framework 
for building resilience and the capability for an effective response that safeguards the 
interests of its key stakeholders, reputation, band and value creating activities (Business 
Continuity Institute & BSI Standard PAS 56)” (Worthington, 2005). 
The term Business Continuity Planning (BCP) is defined by Gartner as: 
•  “Planning for the continuation of business operations in the event of a disaster 
•  Ensure that critical business activities are maintained or restored as quickly as 
possible 
•  Focused on a prioritized resumption of the most critical business functions” 
(Gartner, 2002 p9) 
 
IS Security has previously concentrated on confidentiality of information stored 
electronically.  The rapid growth in the volume of such information and the uptake of e-
Commerce within organisations has heightened the need for increased security to protect 
the privacy of this information and prevent fraudulent activities (Spinellis, 1999). 
The objective of information security is to preserve an organisation’s information assets 
and the business processes they support in the context of (Bell, 2001): 
•  Confidentiality - ensuring that information is only available to the people and 
systems authorised to receive it. Information may be confidential for many reasons 
including privacy, commercial or political; 
•  Integrity - ensuring that information is only changed by people and systems 
authorised to make changes to it; and 
•  Availability - ensuring that information and information processing systems are 
available when information is required (Evans, 2003). 
 
These objectives originate from and are consistent with OECD publications dating back 
to the early 1990’s and also the subsequent (and current) ISO/IEC, BS, Australian 
information and other international security standards, guidelines and handbooks. 
At any time an organisation can experience a disruption to its business operations beyond 
its control.  It may be a major incident with lasting effects such as a flood or fire or may 
be shorter in duration due to an event such as a power failure or denial of access to 
critical offices or systems. 
An organisation can limit the impact of such events through contingency planning 
including the development of a BCP. A BCP is a critical component of IT security in 
general and information security management systems (ISMS) in particular. 
A BCP includes the process of planning to create a state of readiness which will provide 
an immediate response to a disaster affecting a business unit or the IT environment of an 
agency.  A Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP) consists of documented procedures for the 
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management and recovery of the critical IT services of an agency should an unscheduled 
disruption occur. It allows for orderly and timely recovery of the IT processing 
capabilities.   For the purposes of this paper, BCP encompasses DRP and both are 
components of BCM. 
Increasing complexity and dependency on IT by government agencies, the prevalence of 
computer hackers, terrorist threats and the introduction of legislation relating to 
protection of Government records has raised the importance of IT Security and 
Information System Security Management for the Government and its agencies. Although 
the AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2001 standard primarily refers to information and systems 
security (ISS) it includes BCM and the related BCP as an important section.  This means 
that adequate BCM and BCP provisions must be in place to enable the agencies to 
recover from any type of disaster that affects continuity of core government business.  
2. Research Methods 
A forum was conducted on the 4th April 2003 at the Office of Information Technology, 
to determine the key drivers and key inhibitors to Information System Security and 
Business Continuity Management (incorporating BCM and BCP).  At the end of the 
forum, a disaster scenario formed the basis of a roundtable discussion.  Eleven 
representatives from nine government agencies, with both technical and management 
backgrounds, attended the forum.  The agencies ranged in size from small agencies (< 
350 staff for example Arts and Ports), through medium sized agencies (350-1000 staff, 
such as Agriculture and Justice), to large agencies (over 1000 staff members, for example 
Commerce and Health).  These agencies included health, justice, education, Of these 
agencies, one had achieved certification to the AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2001 standard, 
one had not yet started their certification process and the others were in the process of 
achieving certification. 
The process whereby the research forum involved a focus group is one the most common 
methods of qualitative research (Blaikie, 2000; Ross, 2004).  A Delphi rating technique 
was also used to rank and rate issues raised in the forum.  Schmidt et al. (2001) used this 
technique during their research to identify software project risks.  It was determined to be 
a useful way to rank issues that were identified during a brainstorming session.  Forum 
attendees consisted of nine IS Security Managers who were involved in a series of 
question-focused, scenario-based activities guided by a facilitator.  The advantage of this 
group discussion forum method is that it enabled participates to firstly brainstorm ideas, 
and then discuss the ideas prior to rating and ranking the issues disclosed.  The forum 
created an atmosphere that allowed for open interaction and stimulating discussion, and 
provided a flexible environment in which to discover the perceptions and experiences of 
the individual participants.  The forum also uncovered concepts and generated new ideas 
on the topics being discussed. 
The original drivers and inhibitors were taken from suggestions by each participant. Each 
participant was asked to prepare at least one driver and one inhibitor for both ISS and 
BCP. In an exchange of ideas around the table each participant proposed ideas which 
were documented on a whiteboard and the process was repeated until all participants’ 
ideas had been documented. The completed list was discussed, duplicates eliminated, 
then ranked and rated, and the process and was then repeated for inhibitors and again for 
BCP. 
The focus of the forum and follow-up interviews was to determine the key drivers and 
key inhibitors of IS Security and BCM (incorporating BCP) from a whole of government 
perspective.  This research project is essential for government as it highlights a range of 
difficulties faced by agencies when charged with the responsibility to improve/implement 
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their ISS and BCP processes.  The forum identified and allowed the discussion of 
initiatives developed within the individual agencies that should be of benefit across 
government and improve information security. 
The research questions addressed by this study include: 
1. What do you see as the key drivers for successful IS Security for your agency? 
2. What do you see as the key inhibitors to successful IS Security for your agency? 
3. What do you see as the key drivers for BCP to work in your agency? 
4. What do you see as the key inhibitors to successful BCP for your agency? 
 
The issues raised in the forum were scaled by their rank and ratings: 
•  Rank – ranking order of preference (1,2,3…n). This task required the participant to 
order the issues from the most important (numbered ‘1’) to the lease important issue 
in the sequence.  The analysis involved sorting the ranking issued from the most to 
least important. 
•  Rating – involved estimating the magnitude of importance of each issue.  This task 
required the participant to estimate the degree of importance of the individual issue.  
The scale used was a Likert Scale ranging from ‘7’ being the most important to ‘1’ 
being very unimportant.  The analysis involved averaging the ratings across all the 
participants the sorting them in reverse order from the most to least important, thus 
the issue with an average closest to ‘7’ was then rated the most important issue. 
 
The follow-up interview questions were based on the outcomes of the forum and the 
agencies were selected from all agencies within government and stratified into one of 
three groups: 
•  Agencies with established policies, procedures and practices sufficient enough to 
achieve certification to AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2001 within the next few months. 
•  Agencies with developing policies, procedures but are not prepared enough for 
certification within the next 12 months. 
•  Agencies who made limited progress towards certification and would be unlikely to 
achieve certification. 
 
An additional 16 agencies were interviewed using the questions developed from the 
forum. The results from these questions will be discussed in the following sections. 
3. Information System Security  
3.1 Key Drivers for Successful IS Security 
The first focus question discussed at the forum related to identifying key drivers for IS 
Security.  The participants identified the key drivers, which are set out in Table 1.  These 
are the major factors which should contribute to successful IS Security processes within 
government agencies (Baird et al, 2002).   
Table 1 shows the average rankings of these key drivers and the average importance 
ratings given by the participants to each driver. 
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Table 1: Key Drivers For Successful IS Security 
 






Active support of senior management 1 1 6.6 
Commitment of funding 2 2 6.2 
Protection of information assets 3 3 6.1 
Statutory / legislative requirements 4 7 5.6 
Staff awareness & training 5 5 5.7 
Maintain integrity of electronic records 6 4 5.7 
Negative experience(s) can drive change  7 11 5.0 
Compliance with standards e.g. AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2001  8 8 5.3 
 
The issues transcribed from the forum are an accurate summary of the discussion that 
took place.  All issues were rated above 4.3 (> moderately important) indicating that all of 
these issues are worth considering by management as factors that drive successful ISS 
processes within e-government.  In order to differentiate between issues, ranking was 
carried out which revealed the three major issues (refer to Table 1) that are key to 
successful IS Security processes.  These are: 
•  the active support of management 
•  sufficient funding 
•  staff awareness and training.   
 
Comments from the participants emphasise these issues.  The important elements of the 
comments raised in the forum on the need for Senior Management Support include: 
 
“… supported by senior management … the resources are given to you and it’s 
an achievable outcome …” (Participant 10) 
 
The ‘active support of management’ was ranked the most important issue and rated 
number 1 in priority.  The need for Management support is essential and necessary as it is 
senior management that is ultimately accountable and charged with the task of initiating 
and supporting important projects with adequate funding and resources.  The ranking of 
this issue so highly in this forum indicates that, although IS security concerns have been 
recognised by the IT department for many years, senior management has yet to fully 
appreciated the importance of IS Security processes within the business framework.  The 
failure of senior management to fully support IS security processes is limited by the 
expectation of the outcome measured against the performance of other projects within the 
organisation.  It may be difficult for management to approve ongoing funding for IS 
security projects that are not understood or appreciated as being a necessity (that is, of 
high risk), nor as generating profit or reducing costs. 
 
                                                     
1 Rank (of the order assigned by each participant, averaged, then ordered). 
2 Rating [of the importance ranking (1-7 for each issue raised).  This is the sum of this data, in ascending 
order of the average). 
3 Average Rating (The sum of the average ratings across all participants in descending order of the average). 
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“… the reason management support is lacking in many projects is the poor 
explanation of the issues and benefits middle management provide to senior 
management …” (follow up interview) 
 
 “… most business cases for security upgrades are poorly structured and written 
and do not clearly explain the benefits of security and the tasks to be carried out 
…” (follow up interview) 
 
Following on from the issue of Senior Management Support is the ‘Statutory/Legal 
requirements’ which not only affect the integrity of the business but may place legal 
obligations on a Director/CEO and other senior managers of an organisation. 
 
 “… (the) main driver is reducing our agency exposure, whether it’s our losses, 
legal liability, downtime or service loss …” (Participant 1) 
 
This issue of reducing agency exposure has major implications across the whole of an 
organisation as the exposures may lead to a loss of confidential information, a loss of 
reputation and/or financial losses.  This in turn may result in systems having to be 
temporarily removed from public access until solution patches are applied or law 
enforcement services investigate any alleged security breaches.  If service level 
agreements have been established a loss of service may result in contractual penalties or 
legal action. 
Another major issue identified is the issue of ‘Awareness and Training’. 
 
 “… Staff awareness and training, … people need to know what is expected of 
them and they (need) to know the basis of the issues of security so they know what 
they have to contend with and what is expected of them…  we need to make them 
aware and do what’s necessary so that we all know where we stand … ” 
(Participant 9) 
 
With regular changes in the workforce it is difficult to maintain a functional pool of 
knowledge regarding the safe and effective operation of business systems.  As new staff 
commence their duties most of the knowledge conveyed by colleagues is about the 
operational processes rather than concentrating on the security components of the 
business processes.  Until a staff member has been through orientation and received the 
necessary security training, the risk of unsafe business processes is increased.  When staff 
are fully trained, it is crucial that they are aware of the responsibilities and 
accountabilities of their role. 
3.2 Key Inhibitors to Successful IS Security Processes 
The second focus question discussed related to identifying key inhibitors to successful IS 
Security processes.  The participants identified the following key inhibitors, which are set 
out in Table 2.  These are the major factors which would inhibit successful IS Security 
processes within government agencies.   
Table 2 shows the average rankings of these key inhibitors and the average importance 
ratings given by the participants to each inhibitor. 
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Table 2: Key Inhibitors to Successful IS Security Processes 
 
Key Inhibitors to Successful IS Security Processes  
Rank 
Rating Av.  
Rating 
Security needs to part of the development process  
Lack of management awareness 
1 1 6.7 
Lack of security awareness and training for all staff 2 3 6.0 
Lack of allocated funds due to low priority 3 4 5.9 
No negative experiences so it is assumed that everything is ok  4 8 5.4 
Resistance to set up a uniform user interface across the organisation 5 2 6.2 
Lack of consistency of risk management processes across the 
breadth of organization 
6 5 5.7 
Expectation of users to be able to access all information when they 
want. 
7 17 4.7 
Security perceived as hindering productivity 8 6 5.7 
 
Once again all inhibitors raised rated above 4.6 (> moderately important) and hence all 
should be considered, as key factors that may inhibit successful IS security processes 
within government agencies.  The major issue identified as an inhibitor is the issue of 
‘Management Awareness’.  This issue scored the highest in ‘Rating’ and was also 
‘Ranked’ the most important. 
 
“Lack of awareness that information generated belongs to the organisation … ”  
(Participant 4) 
 
The awareness of information as an important resource not only needs to be recognised 
by staff but also by senior management.  The collection and processing of any 
information collected by an organisation will inturn be subsequently used by them or 
other organisations to make decisions about their customers and services.  These 
decisions can be business, financial, personal and may even have life threatening 
consequences. The protection of this information from fraudulent or accidental tampering 
or loss is vital and is clearly a responsibility of management. 
 
“… the perception or assumption with security is that it is solely an IT responsibly rather 
than recognising that it affects the whole business …” (Participant 6) 
 
This quote reinforces the previous comments where management needs to be aware of the 
significance of the relationship between business processes and the IT departments in 
terms of responsibility for information security.  Just because the IT department 
develops/operates the business systems, the information contained within belongs to the 
organisation.  Therefore, security of business information cannot be solely to the 
responsibility of the IT department. 
 
“… IS security is a necessary evil which hindered productivity …”  (Participant 1) 
 
This comment is one of the most common complaints levelled at IT security processes 
from the operational areas.  It is probably also true, effective security has to be protective 
and therefore intrusive to some degree to offer an appropriate level of protection.  One of 
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the aims of a security system designer is to try to make security as easy and practical as 
possible to implement and use, even though the back end development systems can be 
quite complex. 
 
 “… Different size agencies have different needs…”  (follow up interview) 
 
The policies developed by central government tend to place all agencies in the same 
category and fail to recognise the variation in size, function and critically of agencies. 
The initiatives of central agency policy should account for the variations in agencies 
trying to comply with their directives.  
4. Business Continuity Planning (BCP) 
4.1 Key Drivers Business Continuity Planning (BCP) 
The third focus question discussed at the forum relate to identifying key drivers for BCP. 
The participants identified the following key drivers, which are set out in Table 3.  These 
are the major factors, which should contribute to successful BCP processes within 
government agencies.   
Table 3 shows the average rankings of these key drivers and the average importance 
ratings given by the participants to each driver.  
 
Table 3: Key Drivers for BCP Processes to Work in Your Agency 
 
Key Drivers for BCP Processes To Work In Your Agency Rank Rating Av.  Rating 
Recognise that business is the driver not information technology 1 1 6.9 
Standards and legislation for vital records may be enforceable 2 5 5.9 
Use experienced external consultants to improve skilling of staff 3 3 6.1 
Previous negative experience 4 4 6.0 
Assigning appropriate levels of authority 5 2 6.2 
Integration of organisational and community needs if applicable 7 6 5.8 
To protect critical information 6 9 5.3 
BCP processes to encompass the “whole” organisation (planning 
phase for response and recovery) 
8 7 5.8 
 
All factors raised were rated above 4.7 ( > moderately important) indicating that all of 
these issues are worth considering by management as factors that drive successful BCP 
processes within e-government.  Once again the ranking in the table differentiates 
between the issues.  The most common issue on BCP Process Drivers was based on the 
following comment: 
 
“ … That the business is the driver of BCP and not IT driving that …” (Participant 9) 
 
Businesses need to be fully attentive of the union between the business and the BCP 
processes.  This means that the business should not isolate itself from being a stakeholder 
in the BCP processes and allow the IT department to lead the BCP processes.  Although 
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the development of a BCP is usually charged to the IT department, it will become an IT 
Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP) unless business and management are serious about having 
an active role in its development, testing and review.  
 
“….  when you read 7799 (AS/NZS7799) it clearly says that BCP is an integral 
component of gaining that certification …” (Participant 3) 
 
Essentially an effective level of security includes an effective and tested BCP. 
 
“….  it not an imaginary concept, it is a real and pragmatic approach to managing their 
business in a day-to-day environment …” (Participant 4) 
 
BCP is not a document that is quickly assembled, with a report to management that the 
task of BCP is now completed.  BCP is dynamic and involves the active participation of 
the entire organisation.  It is more about the culture of the process to create an effective 
process rather than just a document.  It also requires continual updates, testing and, as 
such is a ‘living’ document. 
4.2 Key Inhibitors to Successful Business Continuity Processes 
The last focus question that was discussed relates to identifying key inhibitors to BCP 
Processes.  The participants identified the following key inhibitors, which are set out in 
Table 4.  These are the major factors, which may contribute to inhibiting successful to 
BCP processes within government agencies.   
Table 4 shows the average rankings of these key inhibitors and the average importance 
ratings given by the participants to each inhibitor. 
 
Table 4: Key Inhibitors to Successful BCP Processes 
 
Key Inhibitors to Successful BCP Processes Rank Rating Av.  Rating
Lack of awareness 1 1 6.7 
Failure to recognise that the business is the driver not information 
technology 
2 2 6.3 
Failure to understand where IT fits into the business model 3 3 6.1 
Lack of allocated and availability of funds for clearly identifiable 
business plans 
4 4 5.9 
Training at all levels to increase awareness 5 5 5.9 
Lack of capacity / resources to test BCP 6 6 5.9 
Lack of current and appropriate BCP processes 7 8 5.6 
Incomplete ‘asset register’ & other information that ‘hooks’ into the plan 8 10 5.6 
 
All BCP inhibitors raised rated above 4.8 (> moderately important) and hence all should 
be considered as key factors that may inhibit successful BCP processes within 
government agencies.  Once again the awareness issue has been raised as one of the key 
inhibitors for BCP processes within agencies.  In this research question, “Awareness” was 
both rated and ranked as number 1. 
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“….  lack of awareness of the need at an executive level because of the perception of no 
real risk ….” (Participant 1) 
 
Some risk managers would rate the chance of a catastrophic event occurring to an 
organisation, requiring the implementation of their BCP, as once in a lifetime.  This 
however, does not absolve management of the responsibility of preparing a BCP to deal 
with a catastrophic event occurring. 
 
“….  lack of capacity to test 24/7 …” (Participant 3) 
 
There can be a lack of resources or capacity within the business or IT systems to fully test 
an organisation’s BCP processes.  Some business systems cannot be shut down or 
switched off-line to be tested because they are mission critical or sometimes have 
potentially life threatening consequences.  It then becomes a management decision to 
determine the appropriate BCP testing strategy based upon the associated risks of the 
organisation.   
 
“… you can have a plan that covers every aspect of your business …” (Participant 6) 
 
This comment may be a little optimistic, but in the event of a disaster, which requires the 
implementation of the BCP processes, all major aspects of the business need to be 
addressed by the plan.  This is usually determined by an appropriate business impact 
analysis (BIA) being undertaken. 
 
 “… using a BCP video in induction training …" 200 eyes looking at security is better 
than 2 IT eyes….” (follow up interview) 
 
This comment highlights the issues of staff awareness and staff induction being a good 
start point for this initiative. However, BCP processes are usually not the only issue 
discussed at induction. Other strategies need to be implemented to ensure BCP processes 
have a high profile within the agency. 
5. Discussion and Limitations 
There is a very good correlation between the ‘ranked’ order and the ‘rating’ order of the 
top 5 issues raised at the forum.  The correlation can be seen in the connectivity (arrows) 
between the ranking and rating columns of Tables 1 to 4.  This further reaffirms the 
importance of the issues raised and the reliability of the individual measures of the 
ranking and rating. 
One major limitation of the initial study is that it only focused on the practices of nine 
government agencies. However, the additional sixteen agencies that participated in the 
follow-up interviews give a more representative result as these agencies were stratified in 
terms of progress towards AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2001 certification rather than 
grouping by agency staff numbers.  Also, it should be noted that only high-level issues 
were covered and while these issues were significant, the purpose was to identify them.  
Exploring these issues in greater detail and linking them to agency certifications remains 
an area for future research. 
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Other issues for further consideration are that there is no overall corporate governance for 
the whole of Government.  Also, each agency has the autonomy to set their individual 
processes and to achieve certification to AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2001. 
6. Conclusion and Future Directions 
The purpose of this paper was to determine the key issues that exist with IS Security and 
BCP processes for Whole of Government and then rank and rate them accordingly.  The 
summary of the main issues across the four focus questions of the forum and follow-up 
interviews includes the majority of the four following issues: 
1. Training 
2. Management Support 
3. Budget / Cost / Resources 
4. Awareness 
 
While not all of these overall issues are applicable to all organisation or agencies, they 
would appear to be relevant to a large number of organisations as key drivers or key 
inhibitors in respect of IS Security and BCP processes. 
The positive effects from successful IS Security and BCP programs in organisations 
should result in the ability to obtain and maintain the support and understanding of 
Management.  
The forum results reinforce the requirement that BCP processes should be an integral part 
of the business plans of every organisation, and not an IT ‘add on’.  Even though IT is 
often the champion and custodian of the BCP process, this does not imply that the IT 
department is the driving force behind its development, maintenance and ongoing testing 
nor is the IT Department solely responsible and accountable for these processes. 
This study highlights the perception of IS Security and BCP issues within government 
organisations.  The second phase of this e-government research program was to expand 
the coverage of the forum, by interviewing more government agencies, using the same set 
of four research questions and allowing them to rate and rank the issues raised by this 
forum. The next phase of this research program is to expand the coverage of the forum 
and interview government agencies and organisations, that are also attempting to achieve 
certification to AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2001 and determine the key drivers and 
inhibitors with agencies certified to AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2001. 
In conclusion, running the same exercise with non-government agencies that are also 
attempting to achieve certification to AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2001 would be beneficial 
as a comparative study and should be of practical assistance to private sector 
organisations. 
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